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Abstract
In this paper we analyze empirically how labor market institutions influence business 
cycle volatility in a sample of 20 OECD countries. Our results suggest that countries 
characterized by high union density tend to experience more volatile movements in 
output, whereas the degree of coordination of the wage bargaining system and 
strictness of employment protection legislation appear to play a limited role for output 
volatility. We also find some evidence suggesting that highly coordinated wage 
bargaining systems have a dampening impact on inflation volatility. 
Keywords: Business Cycles, Inflation, Labor Market Institutions 
JEL Classification: E31, E32 5
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Non-technical Summary
In this paper we investigate empirically how institutional characteristics of the labor mar-
ket inﬂuence business cycle volatility in a panel of 20 OECD countries. The novel aspect
of our analysis is that we focus explicitly on the volatility of macroeconomic variables
across countries.
From a theoretical point of view, labor market institutions may be relevant for busi-
ness cycle dynamics for several reasons. Calmfors and Driﬃll (1988) argue that the
extent to which unions internalize the macroeconomic consequences of their actions has
implications for macroeconomic outcomes. Taking this argument on step further implies
that institutional characteristics of the wage bargaining process inﬂuence the response
of macroeconomic variables to disturbances. Moreover, a large literature initiated by
Andolfatto (1996) and Merz (1995) argues that search and matching processes between
employers and workers determine the dynamics of job and worker ﬂows over the business
cycle. To the extent that search and matching processes are inﬂuenced by the institutional
environment, this literature provides another theoretical basis for our empirical analysis.
Since unions are more likely to take macroeconomic consequences into account when
wage bargaining is coordinated, we expect output and inﬂation volatility to be lower in
countries characterized by highly coordinated wage bargaining systems.
An additional channel through which labor market institutions may inﬂuence aggre-
gate ﬂuctuations is via their impact on job and worker ﬂows. To capture this channel
we add a proxy for the strictness of employment protection legislation. Stricter employ-
ment protection legislation makes ﬁring more costly and is therefore expected to dampen
output volatility.
In addition, we analyze union density as a potential determinant of business cycle
volatility. We view union density primarily as a proxy for the bargaining power of unions.
Strong unions may be less prone to wage moderation in case of an adverse shock and,
thus, we expect that business cycle volatility is larger in countries characterized by higher
union density.
Our empirical approach consists of performing ﬁxed-eﬀect panel regressions of the
standard deviations of the output gap as well as inﬂation on the three labor market6
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institutions mentioned above and several control variables. We ﬁnd that labor market in-
stitutions and in particular the characteristics of unions indeed determine the volatility of
output to some extent. As expected, stronger unionization has a signiﬁcantly positive im-
pact on output volatility, whereas the extent to which wage bargaining is coordinated has
only a small impact on output volatility. In line with the view that in highly coordinated
wage bargaining systems, unions internalize the macroeconomic consequences of their ac-
tions, we ﬁnd that inﬂation volatility is actually lower in economies where coordination
is high.
As an additional analysis we explicitly consider the role of labor market institutions
in the transmission of macroeconomic ﬂuctuations. More speciﬁcally, we add interaction
terms of the institutional variables with measures of the ﬂuctuations in the terms of trade
and in import price inﬂation. We ﬁnd that higher coordination dampens both, output and
inﬂation volatility, which suggests that unions operating in a highly coordinated system
of wage bargaining tend to reduce business cycle volatility.
Overall, our results suggest that unions act only to a limited extent as absorbers of
macroeconomic disturbances. One the one hand, we ﬁnd that a higher degree of coordi-
nation does not necessarily stabilize output. However, on the other hand, coordination
stabilizes inﬂation rates. In this sense, monetary policy may beneﬁt from increased coor-
dination of wage bargaining.7
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1 Introduction
In this paper, we investigate empirically how institutional characteristics of the labor
market inﬂuence business cycle volatility in a panel of OECD countries. In a seminal
paper, Calmfors and Driﬃll (1988) argue that the extent to which unions internalize
the macroeconomic consequences of their actions has implications for macroeconomic
outcomes and speciﬁcally for the unemployment rate. In this paper, we take this argument
one step further and ask how institutional characteristics of the wage bargaining process
inﬂuence the response of macroeconomic variables to disturbances.
In addition to determining the framework within which wages are negotiated, labor
market institutions may be relevant for the business cycle via their impact on job and
worker ﬂows. Based on the search and matching framework (see Mortensen and Pis-
sarides, 1994), recent business cycle research emphasizes the implications of labor market
institutions for aggregate ﬂuctuations (see e.g. Veracierto, 2008; Zanetti, 2006).
The novel aspect of our analysis is that we focus explicitly on the volatility of macroe-
conomic variables across countries. Although the role of labor market institutions for
macroeconomic performance, and in particular long-run unemployment, has been investi-
gated extensively in the literature (see e.g. Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000), only few papers
explore the implications for the business cycle. Nunziata (2003) studies the eﬀect of labor
market institutions on cyclical adjustment of employment and hours worked. Nunziata
and Bowdler (2005) study the implications of labor market institutions for inﬂation dy-
namics but without taking volatility into account. Fonseca et al. (2007) also explore how
labor market institutions are related to the business cycle, but their analysis is concerned
with international co-movement and not volatility.
In terms of the empirical strategy we pursue in this paper, our analysis is closely
related to the literature that studies the determinants of business cycle volatility in a cross-
section framework. Karras and Song (1996) investigate potential sources of business cycle
volatility in a sample of OECD countries and ﬁnd that volatility is related to monetary
as well as real factors. Ferreira da Silva (2002), Buch and Pierdzioch (2005) and Beck
et al. (2006) ﬁnd that ﬁnancially more developed economies experience smoother business
cycles. Kose et al. (2003a) and Kose et al. (2003b) analyze the impact of globalization on8
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macroeconomic volatility. Fat´ as and Mihov (2003) study the role of ﬁscal policy for output
volatility. In contrast to these papers, we exploit not only the cross-section variation, but
also the variation along the time dimension by using a panel data set.
We ﬁnd that labor market institutions and in particular the characteristics of unions
determine to some extent the volatility of output. Stronger unionization has a signiﬁcantly
positive impact on output volatility, which may be related to the bargaining power of
unions. The extent to which wage bargaining is coordinated has only a small impact
on output volatility. In line with the view that in highly coordinated wage bargaining
systems, unions internalize the macroeconomic consequences of their actions, we ﬁnd that
inﬂation volatility is lower in economies where coordination is high. Overall, however, we
ﬁnd only limited evidence in favor of the hypothesis that unions act as shock absorbers.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the role of labor market institu-
tions for the business cycle and brieﬂy surveys the related literature. Section 3 describes
our empirical strategy and the data, while Section 4 presents the estimation results and
Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 Labor Market Institutions and Aggregate Fluctu-
ations
In this section we motivate the hypothesis that labor market institutions inﬂuence the
dynamics of output and inﬂation over the business cycle. Calmfors and Driﬃll (1988)
point out that the organization of the wage bargaining process may have implications for
macroeconomic outcomes. However, their analysis is primarily concerned with the level
of the unemployment rate, therefore the question remains, how a union that internalizes
the consequences of its actions responds to shocks that call for an adjustment of real
wages. Consider for instance an adverse shock that leads to a slow-down in economic
activity and an increase in the inﬂation rate. Unions may react with higher nominal
wage claims to compensate the loss in purchasing power resulting from higher inﬂation.
Consequently, production costs increase due to higher wages and production may slow
down even further.
However, if unions internalize the macroeconomic implications of their high wage9
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claims, they may prefer to let the real wage adjust. In this case, the initial shock is
dampened and the impact on employment, output and inﬂation is less pronounced. Thus,
unions that internalize the macroeconomic consequences of their wage claims can indeed
reduce the impact of disturbances on the economy. Put diﬀerently, by responding appro-
priately, they may act as a shock absorber.
Since unions are more likely to take macroeconomic consequences into account when
wage bargaining is coordinated, we expect output and inﬂation volatility to be lower in
countries characterized by highly coordinated systems of wage bargaining.
Overall, unions in coordinated systems may ensure the appropriate degree of real
wage ﬂexibility to promote macroeconomic adjustment. Several studies document that
real wage ﬂexibility is closely related to the institutional environment in which wage
negotiations take place (see e.g. Clar et al., 2007, and the references therein).1 Thus, the
present paper is also related to this strand of the literature.
So far, our discussion has focussed on unions and the organization of the wage bargain-
ing process. In addition, labor market institutions may inﬂuence aggregate ﬂuctuations
via their impact on job and worker ﬂows. In other words, the search and matching process
between employers and workers may depend on the institutional setting. Merz (1995) and
Andolfatto (1996) were among the ﬁrst to analyze the implications of search and match-
ing frictions in a business cycle framework. They ﬁnd that embedding these aspects into
a real business cycle model improves the ability of these models to match empirically
observed labor market dynamics. Veracierto (2008) analyzes the impact of ﬁring costs in
a real business cycle model.
More recently, several authors have incorporated search and matching frictions into
variants of the New Keynesian model, which currently appears to be the workhorse model
for business cycle analysis (see e.g. Krause and Lubik, 2007; Christoﬀel et al., 2006; Walsh,
2005). They ﬁnd that in general, the ability of the model to replicate key business cycle
characteristics is improved when labor market frictions are modeled. Trigari (2006) studies
the implications of search and matching for inﬂation dynamics in a New Keynesian Model.
Campolmi and Faia (2006) take labor market institutions explicitly into account and
1The importance of real wage ﬂexibility in general is also frequently emphasized in the literature (see
e.g. Pichelmann, 2007).10
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explore to what extent diﬀerences in institutions can explain cyclical inﬂation diﬀerentials
across countries. Zanetti (2006) uses a similar framework and ﬁnds that an increase in
ﬁring costs decreases output volatility while the volatility of inﬂation increases. The reason
is that ﬁring costs make the adjustment of employment costlier than the adjustment of
prices and therefore output ﬂuctuations are damped. Inﬂation, however, becomes more
volatile, since ﬁrms react to shocks by adjusting prices.
3 Empirical Strategy and Data
To investigate the relationship between labor market institutions and macroeconomic
volatility, we start by regressing the standard deviation of the output gap, as measured
by the cyclical component of the real per capita GDP on proxies for the institutional
characteristics of the labor market. Speciﬁcally, our empirical analysis is based on:
σ(yit)=α + β
LMIit + γ
Xit + μi + λt +  it, (1)
where yit is the output gap and σ(·) denotes the logged standard deviation.2 The vector
LMIit contains variables related to the structure of the wage-bargaining process and Xit
is a vector of control variables. We allow for two-way ﬁxed eﬀects in equation (1) by
including country ﬁxed eﬀects, μi, and time ﬁxed eﬀects, λt.
Our sample includes 20 OECD countries (Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Den-
mark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nor-
way, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK and the US). The quarterly series cover
1970:1 to 2006:4. The macroeconomic variables are obtained from the OECD Economic
Outlook (ECO) database. To calculate real GDP per capita we divide real GDP by the
total working age population. We calculate yit as the deviation from the Hodrick-Prescott
(HP) trend.3 Standard deviations are calculated over 5-year non-overlapping intervals.
Data for Labor Market Institutions are taken from Nickell et al. (2001), where the
ultimate data source for most variables are various OECD employment outlooks, e.g.
OECD (1999).
2We follow Fat´ as and Mihov (2003) and use the log of the standard deviations which allows us to
interpret the coeﬃcient estimates as elasticities or semi-elasticities. Qualitatively, our results are not
aﬀected by this transformation.
3Results are similar when the growth rate of per capita GDP is used instead of the output gap.11
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Since the macro data start in 1970 and the labor market institutions variables end
in 1995, we have a panel data set with 6 (ﬁve-year interval) observations in the time
dimension and 20 observations in the cross-sectional dimension.
Note that although labor market institutions are usually assumed to be exogenous, this
need not be the case. One could argue for instance that union density and employment
protection are relatively high when economies face volatile business cycles and not the
other way around. To guard against this possibility of reverse causality we use the initial
values of the interval over which standard deviations are calculated.4
LMIit contains a proxy for the coordination of the wage bargaining process, COit,
union density, UDit, and an index capturing the strictness of employment protection
legislation, EPit. COit is a summary measure reﬂecting whether wage negotiations take
place at the ﬁrm, industry or national level and also the role of government and employers
federations in the wage bargaining process. COit ranges from 1 to 3 where higher values
indicate a higher level of coordination. As it is standard in the literature, we use the
coordination of the wage bargaining process as our main proxy for the degree to which
unions internalize the macroeconomic consequences of wage claims. As described in the
previous section, we expect unions to internalize the macroeconomic eﬀects of their be-
havior to a greater extent in highly coordinated systems. Hence, it appears conceivable
that output and inﬂation evolve in a smoother fashion in economies characterized by more
coordinated wage bargaining systems. In one speciﬁcation we also include an alternative
proxy for the coordination of wage bargaining, COWit. The diﬀerence to the former is
that COWit contains more short-term variation in coordination (see Nickell et al., 2001).
We include union density as a proxy for the bargaining power of unions (see also
Nunziata and Bowdler, 2005). Union density, UDit, refers to the net union membership
rate of employees (gross minus retired and unemployed members). We interpret high
unionization rates as an indication for a strong bargaining position of unions. Since
wage moderation may be rather limited in this case, the response to shocks may be
more pronounced. Thus, we expect that business cycle volatility is larger in countries
characterized by higher values of UDit.
4Using averages taken over the 5-year intervals instead of initial values leaves our results largely
unaltered.12
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Finally, we include a measure for the strictness of employment protection legislation to
proxy ﬁring costs. Employment protection legislation, EPit, is again a summary measure
that broadly summarizes constraints on the dismissal of workers (e.g. period of notice
before dismissal and severance pay). Higher values of the EPit index, which is deﬁned
between 0 and 2, correspond to stronger labor market frictions. According to Zanetti
(2006), we expect output volatility to be smaller in countries with stricter employment
protection legislation while inﬂation volatility should be higher in those countries.
The vector of control variables Xit in (1) contains the log of the standard deviation of
government consumption as a percentage of GDP, σ(GOV ), the logged standard deviation
of the terms of trade, σ(TOT), - where GOV and TOT are deviations from their HP trends
- and per capita GDP in the initial period of the 5-year interval, Y0. The choice of these
control variables is motivated by the existing literature. We include σ(GOV ) to control
for unsystematic ﬁscal policy as suggested by Fat´ as and Mihov (2003). Beck et al. (2006)
ﬁnd that output volatility is inﬂuenced by ﬂuctuations in the terms of trade and that
countries with higher per capita GDP experience smoother cycles.
Throughout the paper we calculate robust standard errors – allowing for heteroskedas-
ticity of unknown form.
4 Results
Table 1 shows the estimation results for (1). The table presents three diﬀerent speci-
ﬁcations. In the second column the results for our baseline speciﬁcation are reported.
In the third column we test for a non-linear eﬀect of the coordination variable in the
spirit of Calmfors and Driﬃll (1988). The last column shows the results when we use an
alternative proxy for coordination.
We see from the second column of the table that the volatility of the cyclical compo-
nent of government consumption, σ(GOV ), has a positive and strongly signiﬁcant impact
on the volatility of the output gap. This result is in line with Fat´ as and Mihov (2003)
who ﬁnd that discretionary ﬁscal policy tends to result in more volatile business cycles.
σ(TOT) turns out to be insigniﬁcant at standard levels and Y0 enters positively and sig-
niﬁcantly, but only at the ten percent level. The positive sign of Y0 is somewhat at odds13
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with the ﬁndings reported in the literature, where countries with higher GDPs are found
to experience smoother cycles. However, these studies typically analyze samples that also
include less developed countries, whereas our sample consists entirely of developed coun-
tries. Similarly, less developed countries are also likely to be more exposed to ﬂuctuations
of terms of trade, which could explain why we do not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant eﬀect of terms
of trade ﬂuctuations on output volatility. The remaining columns of the table show that
these results are robust with respect to diﬀerent speciﬁcations.
Concerning the institutional variables which we are primarily interested in, Table 1
shows that employment protection, EP, does not appear to exert a signiﬁcant inﬂuence
on the volatility of the output gap. This result is in line with the ﬁndings reported in the
empirical literature on employment protection and job ﬂows. Empirically it has proven
hard to establish a relationship between employment protection and job ﬂows. Several
studies argue that despite large diﬀerences in employment protection across countries,
diﬀerences in market outcome are rather small (see e.g. Bertola and Rogerson, 1997).
Overall, the insigniﬁcance of EP in our estimation casts some doubt on the importance
of ﬁring costs for aggregate volatility.
Turning to union density, we see that countries characterized by higher union density
tend to experience more volatile ﬂuctuations in the output gap. The point estimate
of 1.15 implies that a change in union density by one standard deviation increases the
volatility of the output gap by 21 percent.5 This result is robust across speciﬁcations and
consistent with the interpretation that higher unionization as measured by UD indicates
that unions have stronger bargaining power which may result in less wage moderation
and thus in higher macroeconomic volatility.
We also see that the proxy for coordination, CO, enters with a positive and marginally
signiﬁcant coeﬃcient. Thus, so far we ﬁnd no evidence in favor of the hypothesis that
more coordinated wage bargaining systems are characterized by lower output volatility. In
the third column we add the square of CO to allow for a non-linear relationship between
wage coordination and output volatility. Neither CO nor CO2 turn out to be signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero in this speciﬁcation. In the last column, we replace COby COW which
is an alternative proxy for coordination. Here we see that the coeﬃcient on COW remains
5In our sample the variable UD has a mean of 0.43 and a standard deviation of 0.19.14
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positive and again turns out to be signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.
Thus, our results indicate that labor market institutions inﬂuence output volatility to
some extent. However, we ﬁnd no support for the hypothesis that countries characterized
by highly coordinated wage bargaining systems experience greater macroeconomic stabil-
ity. Output volatility may even be ampliﬁed in coordinated systems, although the eﬀect is
only marginally signiﬁcant. A rather robust result is that high union density is associated
with higher output volatility. Hence, our results presented so far cast some doubt on the
role of unions as shock absorbers. Moreover, ﬁring costs which are emphasized in the
search and matching literature do not appear to inﬂuence output volatility.
Next, we evaluate the cross-sectional stability of our results. That is, we delete one
country at the time from the sample and re-estimate equation (1) for the resulting 20
subsamples. Table 2 reports the minima and maxima of the point estimates for the
institutional variables over these subsamples. In addition to the minima and maxima, the
table also shows the corresponding t-ratios and the country which is dropped.
According to the table, EP is always insigniﬁcant, regardless of which country is
excluded. For UD and CO the minima of the point estimates are no longer signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero at standard levels. Overall, however, UD and CO are both signiﬁcant
in 17 out of 20 regressions when dropping individual countries. In addition, the minima
and maxima are obtained when diﬀerent countries are dropped, therefore we conclude
that the results do not appear to be driven by any particular country.6
4.1 The Transmission of Volatility
To study more closely how labor market institutions impact upon business cycle volatility,
we now explore how institutions propagate disturbances that hit the economy. To do so,
we extend our baseline equation to include interaction terms. In particular, we interact
σ(TOT) and σ(GOV ) with EP, UD and CO in (1) to capture the role that institutional
aspects play for the transmission of ﬂuctuations in the terms of trade and government
spending.
6We also repeated the analysis with data starting in 1985 to see if the period before the Great Mod-
eration inﬂuences our results. Qualitatively, our results are quite robust. Detailed results are available
upon request.15
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Note that one could interpret σ(TOT) in terms of structural shocks as in Beck et al.
(2006).7 However, we prefer a more general interpretation and do not view terms of trade
ﬂuctuations as a proxy for a speciﬁc, underlying structural shocks.
The second column of Table 3 shows that none of the interaction terms involving
σ(GOV ) turn out to be signiﬁcantly diﬀerent form zero at standard levels, indicating that
labor market institutions play no role for the transmission of ﬂuctuations in government
spending. From the last column of the table we see that union density tends to signiﬁcantly
amplify the eﬀect of terms of trade ﬂuctuations on output volatility, whereas in this
speciﬁcation, higher coordination signiﬁcantly dampens output volatility.
Overall, adding interaction terms conﬁrms our earlier ﬁndings on the amplifying eﬀect
of union density on output volatility, while it contrasts our previous results by delivering
a dampening eﬀect of coordination on output volatility when we take the transmission of
terms of trade ﬂuctuations explicitly into account. Thus, these results are more in favor
of the role of unions as a shock absorber in highly coordinated wage bargaining systems.
4.2 Inﬂation Volatility
Since it appears conceivable that labor market institutions inﬂuence not only ﬂuctua-
tions in real activity, but also inﬂation dynamics, we now extent our analysis to cover
inﬂation volatility. One way to proceed would be to estimate an equation analogous
to (1) with inﬂation volatility instead of output gap volatility as the dependent variable.
However, such an approach would ignore potentially important interrelationships between
output and inﬂation volatility. For instance, the standard New Keynesian business cycle
model (see e.g. Woodford, 2003) suggests that inﬂation dynamics are partly driven by
real marginal cost. To the extent that the output gap mirrors ﬂuctuations in marginal
cost, output gap volatility may feed back into the volatility of the inﬂation rate.
Thus, we adopt a general speciﬁcation and estimate a system of equations where output
and inﬂation volatility are both treated as endogenous variables. More speciﬁcally, we
include inﬂation volatility, σ(πit), as a right-hand-side variable in (1) and we specify an
7Beck et al. (2006) argue that terms of trade disturbances give rise to variation in input prices and
can therefore be interpreted as productivity shocks.16
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2X2,it + μi + λt +  2,it, (3)
where πit is the quarterly change in the consumer price index and X1,it and X2,it are
vectors containing control variables. We also estimate speciﬁcations, where we augment
(2) and (3) by interaction terms.
As control variables in the inﬂation equation, we include an index for central bank
independence, CBI, and the logged standard deviation of import price inﬂation, σ(IMP),
in addition to σ(GOV ) and Y0 in X2,it. Data on the consumer price index and on import
price inﬂation are obtained from the OECD Economic Outlook (ECO) database.
Since independent central banks are more likely to put a larger weight on price sta-
bility, we expect CBI to dampen inﬂation volatility. Moreover, several studies document
empirically that the impact of coordination of wage bargaining on macroeconomic out-
comes depends also on its interaction with institutional characteristics of central banks.
Cukierman and Lippi (1999) develop a model of the strategic interaction between mone-
tary policy and unions that incorporates labor market institutions. They ﬁnd that central
bank independence inﬂuences the relationship between coordination and macroeconomic
outcomes. The CBI index is obtained from Van Lelyveld (2000) which is an update of
the Cukierman (1992) index of the legal independence of central banks. Its values range
from 0 to 1, where 1 indicates the maximum possible independence of central banks.
Note that in (2), the predetermined variables IMP and CBI are not included and in
(3), TOT is excluded. Therefore, this choice of control variables ensures identiﬁcation of
the system. To allow  1,it and  2,it to be correlated, we estimate the system (2) and (3)
by three-stage least squares.
It has to be pointed out that if we use the richest speciﬁcation of (3) allowing for
country and time ﬁxed eﬀects, we do not ﬁnd a statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect of labor
market institutions on inﬂation volatility. However, once we drop time ﬁxed eﬀects from
(3), the impact of institutions turns out to be statistically signiﬁcant. Note also the time
dummies are jointly insigniﬁcant at standard levels in (3). Therefore, we report the results
from the system estimation only for the case where time dummies are not included in (3).17
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Table 4 shows the results. In columns two and three the table shows the estimation
results for the system (2) and (3). The remaining columns of the table show the results
we obtain, when we augment the system by interaction terms to explicitly study the
transmission of volatility.
We see from columns two and three that, although output gap volatility has a positive
and signiﬁcant impact on inﬂation volatility, inﬂation volatility does not directly aﬀect
the volatility of the output gap. We also see that the volatility of import price inﬂation
signiﬁcantly impacts upon the standard deviation of inﬂation. In addition, countries with
higher initial levels of per capita real GDP tend to have less volatile inﬂation rates. This
result is similar to Nunziata and Bowdler (2005) who ﬁnd a negative impact of per capita
GDP on the level of inﬂation.
Turning to the labor market variables, we ﬁnd that UD tends to increase output
volatility, which is in line with our previously reported results. A high level of coordination
dampens inﬂation volatility. CO has the expected negative sign and is highly signiﬁcant
in (3). That is, our results indicate that inﬂation volatility tends to be lower in countries
characterized by highly coordinated systems. Thus, we ﬁnd that, although a higher degree
of coordination may not stabilize output, it contributes to stable inﬂation rates.
The last two columns show the results when we add interaction eﬀects to the system.
We interact the institutional variables with σ(TOT) in (2) similar to our previous analysis.
Since σ(TOT) is not included in (3) we interact σ(IMP) instead to study the transmission
to inﬂation volatility. We ﬁnd that employment protection legislation and union density
tend to amplify the eﬀect of terms of trade ﬂuctuations on output volatility, although
the interaction term involving EP is only marginally signiﬁcant. Coordination, however,
signiﬁcantly dampens the transmission of ﬂuctuations in the terms of trade to output
volatility. These ﬁndings conﬁrm our previous results. Turning to the results for inﬂation
volatility, the last column of Table 4 shows that coordination has a negative and strongly
signiﬁcant impact on the propagation of import price ﬂuctuations.
Overall, we ﬁnd that coordination dampens output and inﬂation volatility at least
when the transmission of ﬂuctuations in TOT and IMP, respectively, is considered. Thus,
these results are more in favor of a role of unions as a shock absorber in highly coordinated18
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wage bargaining systems. Nevertheless, our results still indicate that strict employment
protection legislation and a high union density tend to increase output volatility in the
transmission of terms of trade ﬂuctuations.
5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we explore the extent to which labor market institutions shape the adjust-
ment of output and inﬂation over the business cycle. We ﬁnd that countries characterized
by a high union density tend to experience larger ﬂuctuations in output. If we interpret
high unionization rates as an indication of stronger bargaining power, then this result
is in line with the idea that stronger unions successfully resist wage moderation dur-
ing economic downturns and thereby amplify shocks that hit the economy. Employment
protection legislation, in contrast, does not appear to play a role in this context.
We also ﬁnd some evidence in favor of the hypothesis that inﬂation rates are less
volatile in economies characterized by highly coordinated wage bargaining systems. Thus,
our results are consistent with the hypothesis that by internalizing the consequences
of their actions, unions operating in coordinated systems contribute to the stability of
inﬂation rates. In this sense, monetary policy may beneﬁt from increased coordination.
However, concerning the eﬀect of coordination on output volatility, we ﬁnd only little
evidence in favor of a dampening eﬀect.
Thus, our results suggest that unions act only to a limited extent as shock absorbers.
This result might be due to limited information about the shocks that hit the economy.
Even if unions take the consequence of their actions into account and try to dampen
shocks, this objective may be complicated by the fact that the appropriate response may
depend on the type of shock. Since unions, just like policy makers, may only observe
ﬂuctuations in aggregate variables without being aware of the type of underlying shock,
they may simply not have enough information to fully stabilizing.
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Table 1: Labor Market Institutions and Output Gap Volatility
σ(GOV ) 0.51 *** 0.51 *** 0.55 ***
(6.19) (6.12) (6.34)
σ(TOT) -0.05 -0.06 -0.08
(-0.61) (-0.62) (-0.82)
Y0 0.81 * 0.81 * 1.05 **
(1.75) (1.73) (2.45)
EP 0.03 0.03 0.06
(0.22) (0.22) (0.41)
UD 1.15 ** 1.13 ** 1.11 *
(1.99) (2.06) (1.83)






Obs 119 119 119
R2 0.64 0.64 0.63
Notes: t-statistics in parenthesis. ∗ denotes signiﬁcance at the 10%, ∗∗ at the 5% and ∗∗∗ at the 1% level.
In addition to the variables displayed in the table, the equation contains country and time ﬁxed eﬀects.
Table 2: Cross Sectional Stability
Min Country Max Country
EP -0.04 Denmark 0.17 Sweden
(-0.27) (0.61)
UD 0.72 Spain 1.53 Denmark
(1.36) (2.26)
CO 0.25 UK 0.61 Italy
(1.38) (2.92 )
Notes: The tables gives the minima and maxima of the coeﬃcients when one country at the time is
dropped, as well as the country which is dropped. t-statistics in parenthesis.23
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Table 3: Adding interaction eﬀects












EP ∗ σ(GOV ) 0.14
(0.79)
UD∗ σ(GOV ) 0.44
(1.05)
CO∗ σ(GOV ) -0.12
(-0.68)
EP ∗ σ(TOT) 0.15
(1.47)
UD∗ σ(TOT) 1.04 ***
(3.53)




Notes: t-statistics in parenthesis. ∗ denotes signiﬁcance at the 10%, ∗∗ at the 5% and ∗∗∗ at the 1% level.
In addition to the variables displayed in the table, the equation contains country and time ﬁxed eﬀects.24
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Table 4: System Estimation (3SLS)
dependent variable σ(y) σ(π) σ(y) σ(π)
σ(π) -0.38 -0.24
(-0.64) (-0.89)
σ(y) 0.71 *** 0.49 **
(2.59) (2.41)
σ(GOV ) 0.56 *** -0.27 0.56 *** -0.13
(5.23) (-1.40) (7.00) (-0.87)
σ(TOT) -0.06 -0.21
(-0.73) (-0.92)
σ(IMP) 0.16 *** 0.62 ***
(2.73) (3.06)
Y0 0.59 -1.47 *** 0.63 -1.68 ***
(0.95) (-6.55) (1.26) (-8.36)
CBI 0.47 0.41
(1.22) (1.02)
EP 0.14 0.25 0.86 * 0.21
(0.54) (1.33) (1.72) (0.90)
UD 1.15 ** -0.77 6.06 *** -0.80
(2.23) (-1.24) (4.00) (-1.43)
CO 0.30 -0.48 ** -0.75 -0.02
(1.39) (-2.03) (-1.38) (-0.10)
EP ∗ σ(TOT) 0.20 *
(1.69)
UD∗ σ(TOT) 1.15 ***
(3.41)
CO∗ σ(TOT) -0.26 **
(-2.15)




CO∗ σ(IMP) -0.27 ***
(-2.83)
Obs 119 119 119 119
R2 0.64 0.69 0.73 0.74
Notes: t-statistics in parenthesis. ∗ denotes signiﬁcance at the 10%, ∗∗ at the 5% and ∗∗∗ at the 1% level.
In addition to the variables displayed, the output equation contains country and time ﬁxed eﬀects and
the inﬂation equation contains time ﬁxed eﬀects.25
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